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Rethinking Environmental Contracting
Natasha A. Affolder*
Environmental contracts occupy an ill-defined middle ground between com-
mand and control regulation and voluntary initiatives. These agreements have cap-
tured the imagination of policymakers and scholars in the U.S. and Europe in par-
ticular. They are heralded as promising examples of “new governance.” This
Article explores a little known example of environmental contracting which
emerged in the context of a Canadian diamond mine — the Ekati Environmental
Agreement. Through a fine-grained case study of the Ekati Agreement, this article
challenges some of the assumptions that shape the “environmental contracting
literature as well as the wider literature on “new governance.” By debunking the
myths about contracting that pervade this theoretical literature, we can deepen our
analysis of the complex interplay between regulating and contracting for environ-
mental protection.
Les ententes environnementales constituent une solution mitoyenne mal
de´finie entre les re`glements contraignants et les projets volontaires. Ces ententes
suscitent beaucoup d’inte´reˆt de la part des de´cideurs et des intellectuels aux ´Etats-
Unis et plus particulie`rement en Europe. Elles sont vues comme des exemples
prometteurs d’une « nouvelle gouvernance ». Le pre´sent article traite d’une entente
environnementale me´connue relative a` une mine de diamants canadienne :
l’entente Ekati. Par une analyse de´taille´e du cas d’Ekati, l’article pre´sente un exa-
men de certaines des hypothe`ses qui ont e´te´ de´gage´es de la documentation portant
sur les ententes environnementales, et de fac¸on plus ge´ne´rale, sur « la nouvelle
gouvernance ». La de´mystification des mythes entretenus par les e´crits the´oriques
relatifs aux ententes permettra d’approfondir notre analyse sur l’interaction com-
plexe entre la re´glementation et les ententes sur la protection de l’environnement.
1. INTRODUCTION
Are you searching for “innovations in environmental policy”?1 Flexibility?
Worried about the calcified nature of regulation? Shocked by the gaps in legislative
regimes? Troubled by the lack of coordination between dispersed environmental
* Assistant Professor, Faculty of Law, University of British Columbia. I thank Jacqueline
Kotyk and Julie Desbrisay for excellent research assistance. I am also grateful to the
Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada and the Law Foundation
of British Columbia for the funding that supported this research.
1 David A. Dana, “Symposium: Innovations in Environmental Policy: The New ‘Con-
tractarian’ Paradigm in Environmental Regulation” (2000) U. Ill. L. Rev. 35.
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policy tools? Are you unable to trust government bureaucrats? Searching for more
localized forms of environmental regulation? If so, look no further than the “con-
tractarian paradigm” of environmental governance, that is being advanced in the
U.S. and European legal literature with near missionary zeal. Although environ-
mental contracts may not be entirely familiar to many Canadian audiences it may
be time for Canada, a country previously condemned as “unimaginative”2 in its
environmental instrument choice, to examine this “innovative” and “increasingly
popular”3 tool. As criticism of command and control forms of environmental regu-
lation mounts, contracts are heralded as part of a promising “new generation” of
environmental governance.4
Environmental agreements occupy an amorphous and ill-defined space be-
tween command and control regulation and voluntary initiatives. Broadly defined,
environmental contracts are negotiated and enforceable agreements addressing en-
vironmental issues. Agreements may be between companies and regulators, compa-
nies and community groups, or companies and indigenous peoples. They may tran-
scend the individual company unit and involve entire industries. An environmental
contract can supplement existing regulation or it can offer an alternative to an oth-
erwise applicable regulatory regime. Given the wide diversity of forms of and par-
ties to environmental contracts, it is not surprising that there is confusion in the
literature about what contracts can achieve.
In 1997, an environmental contract was concluded as part of a package of
agreements and regulation to govern the Ekati Mine, Canada’s first diamond mine.5
The parties to the agreement are the Government of Canada, the Government of the
Northwest Territories (GNWT) and the project proponent, BHP Billiton Diamonds
Inc. (BHPB). Four Aboriginal groups, the Kitikmeot Inuit Association, the Dogrib
Treaty 11 Council, the Akaitcho Treaty 8, and the North Slave Metis Alliance,
were actively involved in the contract negotiation. These groups were not included
as parties to the contract. Instead, they became signatories to an implementation
protocol; a side agreement that involved the Aboriginal organizations in the estab-
lishment of a monitoring agency for the mine.
2 Mark S. Winfield, “An Unimaginative People: Instrument Choice in Canadian Envi-
ronmental Law and Policy” (2008) 7 Sask. L. Rev. 79.
3 The Environmental Law Network International, Environmental Agreements: The Role
and Effect of Environmental Agreements in Environmental Policies (London: Cameron,
May, 1998).
4 See Richard B. Stewart, “A New Generation of Environmental Regulation” (2001) 29
Capital U.L. Rev. 21 [Stewart]; Daniel J. Fiorino, The New Environmental Regulation
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 2006).
5 Environmental Agreement dated as of 6 January 1997 between Her Majesty the Queen
in Right of Canada as represented by the Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern De-
velopment and the Government of the Northwest Territories as represented by the Min-
ister of Resources, Wildlife and Economic Development, and BHP Diamonds Inc,
[Ekati Environmental Agreement], online:
<http://www.monitoringagency.net/Portals/0/pdf/key_documents/BHP%20Environ
mental%20Agreement1997.pdf>. The other agreements included a Socio-Economic
Agreement between the company and the Government of the Northwest Territories,
and Impact and Benefit Agreements with each of the four affected Aboriginal groups.
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The significance of the Ekati Environmental Agreement extends beyond the
context of a single mine because this agreement has served as the prototype for
agreements for other large Canadian mining projects. Major developments in the
Canadian North, such as the Mackenzie Gas Pipeline, are now accompanied by
calls for project-specific agreements building on this template.6 Given the ongoing
demands for environmental agreements in new projects, and given interest at policy
levels in “new governance” approaches,7 this article examines contracting as a
form of environmental governance through the lens of a case study of the Ekati
Agreement.
A growing body of largely theoretical literature now expounds on the promise
of environmental contracting.8 But empirical studies of actual environmental con-
tracts largely document the failure of such agreements to uphold this theoretical
promise.9 The Ekati Environmental Agreement appears to buck this trend. In many
respects this Agreement has succeeded in achieving its aims. Although the experi-
ence of the Ekati Agreement tells us much about what contracts can achieve, it also
offers a corrective to a narrow framing of both contracts and regulation.
This article proceeds in four parts. Part One introduces the concept of an envi-
ronmental contract. Part Two sets out a detailed discussion of the Ekati Agreement.
Why did it emerge? What does it provide? What promise and pitfalls are revealed
by the experience? This discussion is informed by a series of interviews of key
actors, conducted in the Northwest Territories and British Columbia.10 The choice
6 See e.g. Mackenzie Gas Project, Joint Review Panel, Round 1, Information Request:
CARC_R1-02 (Canadian Arctic Resources Committee Information Request asking
whether various government departments would enter into an Environmental Agree-
ment with the Proponent and Aboriginal governments).
7 See Bradley C. Karkkainen, “‘New Governance’ in Legal Thought and in the World:
Some Splitting as Antidote to Overzealous Lumping” (2004-2005) 89 Minn. L. Rev.
471 at 496. (“New Governance is not a single model, but a loosely related family of
alternative approaches to governance, each advanced as a corrective to the perceived
pathologies of conventional forms of regulation.”)
8 See Stewart, supra note 4; Daniel C. Esty, “Preface” to Eric W. Orts & Kurt Dekete-
laere, eds., Environmental Contracts: Comparative Approaches to Regulatory Innova-
tion in the United States and Europe (London: Kluwer Law International, 2001) xiii;
supra note 1.
9 See e.g. Rena I. Steinzor, “Reinventing Environmental Regulation: The Dangerous
Journey From Command to Self-Control” (1998) 22 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 103 at 136;
Jennifer Jeser, “Habitat Conservation Plans Under Section 10 of the Endangered Spe-
cies Act: The Alabama Beach Mouse and the Unfulfilled Mandate of Species Recov-
ery” (1998) 26 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 131 at 182.
10 This article draws on interviews and document analysis conducted through field re-
search by the author in the Northwest Territories and British Columbia between 2004
and 2009. During this time, data was collected on the Agreement’s negotiation and
implementation using semi-structured interviews of key actors and analysis of agree-
ment texts, company documents, reports, and correspondence. The interviews involved
individuals with leadership positions in mining companies, their legal counsel, federal
and territorial governments, monitoring agencies for the Ekati mine, and the neighbour-
ing Snap Lake and Diavik mines, and members of the affected communities. These
interviews were carried out with ethical approval from the University of British Colum-
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of an interview-based methodology for this study reflects the context-specific na-
ture of environmental contracting and the need to understand, in a finely textured
way, the cultural and political dimensions of the negotiating history of this agree-
ment. The Ekati case study exemplifies the potential of contracts to fill regulatory
gaps, involve traditionally non-contracting parties, and introduce innovative moni-
toring institutions. However, the experience does not confirm that these gains could
only be realized through a contractual instrument.
Close attention to what happened at Ekati allows one to critically engage with
the wider literature on environmental agreements. This is the objective of Part
Three wherein the Ekati experience is used to highlight eight assumptions that un-
derlie the current literature on environmental contracting. These assumptions re-
main both unacknowledged and largely unchallenged in the literature on environ-
mental contracts. Nonetheless, they reveal key questions that must be addressed in
order to evaluate any claim that environmental contracts are a superior, or preferred
tool, to regulation. Highlighting the assumptions that surround the contractual form
is a way of unpacking the terrain of political struggle that surrounds this form of
governance. Indeed, Part Four concludes by drawing attention to the political
dimensions of this legal tool.
The ongoing assault on command and control forms of environmental regula-
tion from multiple directions has created a market opportunity for “new,” “innova-
tive,” and “collaborative” forms of environmental governance.11 It is, therefore,
unsurprising that scholars of “new governance” in certain Western democracies
have claimed environmental contracts as yet another example of a transformation
from regulation to governance. But, there comes a time when it’s useful to look
beyond the sales pitch language of newness, of innovation, of cooperation, and of
deliberation. While environmental contracts can thus be framed as indicative of a
preferred form of governance, they can also be analyzed, quite simply, as agree-
ments between parties. This article proceeds on both levels of analysis.
2. CONCEPTUALIZING ENVIRONMENTAL CONTRACTS
Environmental Agreements have now emerged in various jurisdictions in both
Canada and a number of other countries.12 The practice of environmental con-
bia’s Behavioural Research Ethics Board. All interviews were conducted with the writ-
ten consent of the participants. To protect the identities of those interviewees who re-
quested anonymity, subjects are assigned simply a letter reference and the interview
date — the location of individual interviews is not provided. Full transcripts of the in-
terviews are on file with the author.
11 On the “shifting architecture” of environmental law and governance, see Neil Gun-
ningham, “Environmental Law, Regulation and Governance: Shifting Architectures”
(2009) 21 J. Envtl. L. 179.
12 On agreements in Canada, see Ciaran O’Faircheallaigh, Environmental Agreements in
Canada: Aboriginal Participation, EIA Follow-up and Environmental Management of
Major Projects (Calgary: Canadian Institute of Resources Law, 2006)
[O’Faircheallaigh]; Meinhard Doelle, “Regulating the Environment by Mediation and
Contract Negotiation: A Case Study of the Dona Lake Agreement” 2 J.E.L.P. 189
[Doelle]. For Europe and the United States, see Eric W. Orts & Kurt Deketelaere, eds.,
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tracting encompasses a tremendous diversity of agreements. Despite differences,
contracts share the characteristic of offering a highly contextualized response to
project-specific, firm-specific, or industry-specific environmental governance
issues.
In Canada, the federal ministry of Indian and Northern Affairs Canada
(INAC)13 explains the scope and justification of environmental agreements in this
way: 
Environmental Agreements are legally binding contracts between two or
more parties that may address oversight mitigation measures identified in
the Report of Environmental Assessment and/or monitoring provisions for a
development project with the objective to prevent any adverse environmen-
tal effects. The purpose of Environmental Agreements may be to establish,
in a public document, the legally binding roles and responsibilities of INAC,
the proponent, other governments, and affected parties with regard to inter-
active environmental management practices during the construction, opera-
tion, reclamation, and post-closure phases of a specific project. The contents
of Environmental Agreements are project-specific. Environmental Agree-
ments are not required under legislation and are not required for all
projects.14
INAC indicated in a 2002 statement that it had developed six environmental
agreements over the past 20 years to deal with the significant adverse environmen-
tal impacts of large-scale development projects.15 These Canadian agreements have
attracted the attention of environmental managers, mining engineers, and geogra-
phers, but they have received less attention from legal scholars.16 In part, this may
be because legal scholars appear reluctant to embrace transactional documents as
fodder for legal scholarship.17 This may be due to the one-off nature of these docu-
Environmental Contracts: Comparative Approaches to Regulatory Innovation in the
United States and Europe (London: Kluwer Law International, 2001) [Orts & Dekete-
laere]; and supra note 3. On Japan, see e.g. Eckhard Rehbinder, “Ecological Contracts:
Agreements between Polluters and Local Communities” in G. Teubner, L. Farmer & D.
Murphy, eds., Environmental Law and Ecological Responsibility: The Concept and
Practice of Ecological Self-Organization (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1994) 147 at
151 [Rehbinder].
13 INAC is also referred to in this article as the Department of Indian Affairs and North-
ern Development (DIAND).
14 Mackenzie Valley Environmental Impact Review Board, Paramount Cameron Hills
Extension Environmental Assessment (EA03-005), Indian and Northern Affairs Can-
ada’s Response Dated 19 January 2004 (Response IR Number 1.2.31 to Fort Provi-
dence Metis Council, MVEIRB Information Request 1.1.34) (on file with author).
15 Mackenzie Valley Environmental Impact Review Board, Information Request #1.1.70,
Snap Lake Diamond Project Environmental Assessment, INAC’s Response dated 3
June 2002 (on file with author).
16 But see Doelle, supra note 12; Steven A. Kennett, Project-Specific Environmental
Agreements in the NWT: Review of Issues and Options (2001) (unpublished draft report
on file with author) [Kennett].
17 But see Michael P. Vandenbergh, “The Private Life of Public Law” (2005) 105 Colum.
L. Rev. 2029.
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ments and the challenges associated with identifying and obtaining such agree-
ments. It may also be explained by the reluctance of many legal scholars to move
beyond the usual diet of statutory research sources and judicial opinion.
But, a rich source of thoughtful theoretical work on environmental contracts
does exist for Canadian researchers. Pioneering work on environmental contracts
undertaken by Andrew R. Thompson, Barry Barton, and their colleagues at the
University of British Columbia in the early 1980s highlights the potential for envi-
ronmental agreements to respond to regulatory inadequacies in the environmental
area. As actual contracts were not yet in existence, these researchers theorized mod-
els for contracting as an alternative to criminal law mechanisms for pollution con-
trol,18 and as a form of environmental governance particularly well-suited to the
Canadian North.19 The Thompson Report identified northern resource development
as an ideal testing ground for contractual approaches given the small number of
parties and well-defined interests. Now, with over a decade of experience of these
agreements, it is an opportune time to revisit this early theoretical work to test the
hypotheses advanced over two decades ago.
The use of environmental agreements is often framed in the literature as a
response to implementation and enforcement deficits in environmental law.20 In
Canada, the inadequacies of environmental assessment processes, and, particularly,
the lack of environmental assessment follow-up, are identified as factors motivating
the adoption of project-specific environmental agreements.21 But this is not a com-
plete explanation. Canadian agreements are fuelled by a legacy of colonialism, a
historic exclusion of Aboriginal groups, and a mistrust of government. Federal and
territorial governments are key environmental overseers in the North, but they are
also tasked with attracting mining investment and participating in mining projects
as tax collectors, equity participants, and dividend receivers. These multiple (and
conflicting) roles can undermine government’s ability to operate as an effective
environmental regulator. In the face of legislative and regulatory inaction, non-state
actors have turned to environmental agreements as a form of “social self-help.”22
Further, in the case of agreements such as the Ekati Agreement, institutions have
been created to serve as environmental “watchdogs” on both companies and
governments.
The Thompson Report cites a number of anticipated advantages of contracts
over exclusively regulatory approaches. These include the ability of contracts to
deliver certainty and structure, to promote a consensual approach to environmental
management, to offer a mechanism to coordinate regulatory efforts, to fill gaps in
regulation, to be tailored to specific circumstances, and to be introduced in a grad-
18 See Barry J. Barton, Robert T. Franson & Andrew R. Thompson, A Contract Model for
Pollution Control (Vancouver: Westwater Research Centre, 1984).
19 Andrew R. Thompson & Harriet I. Rueggeberg, “Contracts in Environmental Manage-
ment and Conservation in the North, Final Report, 1986” [Thompson Report].
20 Rehbinder, supra note 12 at 148.
21 Lindsay Galbraith, Ben Bradshaw & Murray B Rutherford, “Towards a New Supra-
Regulatory Approach to Environmental Assessment in Northern Canada”, (March
2007) 25(1) Impact Assessment and Project Appraisal 27.
22 Rehbinder, supra note 12 at 148.
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ual manner.23 The concerns anticipated in that same report include the threat that
contracts will impair the regulatory system by reducing discretion, undermining
public accountability and encouraging greater interdepartmental conflict. Will con-
tracts be implemented? Will the public perceive that their interests are excluded?
Without clear mechanisms for public input, will unambitious public authorities fail
to negotiate robust contractual regimes? Will contracts ever be enforced given the
contractual rule of privity?24 These are all questions to revisit in Section Three after
we examine what happened at Ekati.
3. THE EKATI MINE, NORTHWEST TERRITORIES
(a) Project Background
The location and political and legal context of the Ekati mine are significant in
explaining the Environmental Agreement. Ekati is Canada’s first diamond mine. It
is located near Lac de Gras in the Northwest Territories, 200 kilometres from the
Arctic Circle. In 1997, the region had little recent experience with large-scale in-
dustrial development. The mine officially opened in October 1998 and now pro-
duces approximately six per cent of current world rough diamond supply by
value.25 The Ekati project was set against a backdrop of unsettled land claims and a
legal regime that contemplated the North as a “colony.”26 The key “environmental”
regulator of the project was the leaseholder — the federal Department of Indian
Affairs and Northern Development (DIAND). In addition to DIAND, multiple gov-
ernment departments at the federal and territorial levels held jurisdiction over vari-
ous elements of the project.
(b) The Environmental Agreement
As Ekati was the first mine to be developed in the area in over a decade, regu-
latory and negotiation processes had to catch up with the evolving expectations of
local Aboriginal peoples. Neither a prototype legal agreement, monitoring institu-
tion model nor a defined regulatory path for a project of this magnitude were avail-
able. As a result, the process of project approval was marked by innovations in
project governance, and a central role emerged for negotiated agreements as a key
element of the regulatory and benefits package for the mine.27 The Environmental
23 Thompson Report, supra note 19 at 7.
24
“Proceedings of the Workshop Held March 25-26, 1986 in Yellowknife, Northwest
Territories,” included in the Thompson Report, supra note 19 at 4.
25 BHP Billiton, Ekati Mine, online:
<http://www.bhpbilliton.com/bb/ourBusinesses/diamondsSpecialtyProducts/ekati
DiamondMine.jsp>.
26 Interview with subject G (22 August 2009).
27 For a discussion of the Impact and Benefit agreements and the Socio-Economic Agree-
ment, see Canadian Institute of Resources Law, Independent Review of the BHP Dia-
mond Mine Process (Calgary: Canadian Institute of Resources Law, 1997) [Indepen-
dent Review]; Irene Sosa & Karyn Keenan, Impact and Benefit Agreements between
Aboriginal Communities and Mining Companies: Their Use in Canada (Toronto: Ca-
nadian Environmental Law Association, 2001) [Sosa & Keenan].
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Agreement grew out of concerns about the inadequacy of existing statutory
frameworks to deal with a large-scale project of this nature, and a lack of trust by
Aboriginal and non-governmental participants that the government would rigor-
ously monitor the environmental impacts of the mine.
During the public review hearings, participants questioned whether BHPB’s
adaptive environmental management strategy would sufficiently address their con-
cerns about the project’s impact on caribou, water, and fish, among other re-
sources.28 Perceived gaps in the regulatory regime included effective governance of
impacts on wildlife, air quality, and the socio-economic impacts of the mine.29 The
fact that DIAND was tasked with both attracting economic development and pro-
tecting the environment led to fear that a less than rigorous approach to environ-
mental protection and monitoring would result.
A particular dissatisfaction with the environmental assessment (EA) process
also spurred the creation of the Environmental Agreement.30 While the Mackenzie
Valley EA processes have been cited as examples of “best practices” of EA in Can-
ada,31 dissatisfaction with the Ekati EA was loudly expressed. Aboriginal commu-
nities and environmental groups felt that the process was undermined by tight
timeframes and the limited scope of assessment.32 They were concerned about the
lack of mechanisms to ensure that BHPB would implement the verbal promises it
made during the hearings. The legacy of exclusion of Aboriginal communities and
failure to value their vast knowledge of the northern environment led to a “cyni-
cism and even hostility” towards the entire EA process.33
Other factors further contributed to create impetus for something beyond the
project specific deliverables of the EA process. These included: the newness of
diamond mining to the North; the perceived failure of previous efforts to regulate
mines properly; the absence of a comprehensive environmental regime governing
wildlife protection and air quality effects; concerns about protected areas raised by
the World Wildlife Fund;34 the need for financial security to back-up environmen-
28 Kevin O’Reilly, The BHP Independent Environmental Monitoring Agency as a Man-
agement Tool (Yellowknife: Canadian Arctic Resources Committee, 1998).
29 Kennett, supra note 16 at 11.
30 The EA process was initiated before the new Canadian Environmental Assessment Act
(CEAA) became law. Although the form and content of the new CEAA was known at
the time, the project proponents decided to file under the existing Environmental As-
sessment and Review Guidelines Order to avoid being the first project to be assessed
under new legislation. Interview with subject B (16 July 2009).
31 Sarah Njoki Macharia, “A Framework For Best Practice Environmental Impact Assess-
ment Follow-up: A Case Study of the Ekati Diamond Mine, Canada” (M.A. Thesis,
University of Saskatchewan, 2005) [unpublished].
32 Supra note 28.
33 Ciaran O’Faircheallaigh, “Making Social Impact Assessment Count: A Negotiation-
Based Approach for Indigenous Peoples” (1999) 12(1) Society and Natural Resources
63 at 64.
34 In 1996, the World Wildlife Fund (WWF) of Canada initiated a lawsuit for judicial
review of the EA Panel Report based on the government’s failure to adequately con-
sider the issue of protected areas designation. The application for judicial review was
withdrawn when the federal government promised to develop a plan for protected areas
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tal promises;35 and the determination of Aboriginal communities to secure monitor-
ing of both the company and government.
Two months after the environmental review panel filed its report, those in-
volved with the project awaited the imminent project approval by the Minister. In-
stead, on August 8, 1996, the DIAND Minister Ron Irwin announced that before
granting final approval, he would need to see “significant progress,” within 60
days, on the negotiation of a suite of agreements including impact and benefit
agreements, a socio-economic agreement, and an environmental agreement. On the
subject of the environmental agreement, he stated: 
To ensure all 29 recommendations and the commitments made by BHP are
applied during the management of the project, the federal government will
negotiate a binding environmental agreement with the company. This agree-
ment will cover all those issues which are not normally part of license terms
and conditions. It will provide a visible record of the commitments of the
company to carry out environmental monitoring, monitoring programs, and
to prevent and mitigate environmental impacts. . . . I will be assessing pro-
gress on the environmental and benefits agreements before signing the water
license for the project.36
Prior to this statement, there had been no warning (or even a hint) that an
environmental agreement was being contemplated, let alone required. In the words
of one of BHPB’s lawyers: “Having done everything the law required, BHP was
now faced with these additional discretionary items which had to be completed
within 60 days, failing which the minister had threatened not to sign the badly-
needed water license.”37 The Minister used his leverage over the water license to
secure these additional agreements for which there was no legal basis.38
Once the negotiation began, the process quickly moved “well beyond what the
government and BHPB had ever anticipated.”39 This was particularly the case with
respect to Aboriginal participation in the negotiations. The first negotiation session
for the agreement was terminated early by DIAND who had been instructed to en-
sure that the Aboriginal groups would be involved. At the second negotiation ses-
sion, the Aboriginal groups took a seat at the table and assumed a leadership role in
in the region. “Deal Reached to Protect Arctic Wilderness Sites” Globe and Mail (14
January 1997) A4.
35 The failure by government to ensure that earlier projects had posted sufficient funds to
guarantee reclamation, such as the Colomac and Giant Mine, made an environmental
agreement attractive for the opportunity it offered to secure adequate security deposits
before the mining operation would be allowed to proceed. David H. Searle, John M.
Olynyk & Kathryn Vennand, “Doing Business In Canada’s North: the Yukon, the
Northwest Territories, and Nunavut” (2000) 46 Proceedings of Rocky Mountain Min-
eral Law Institute 4-1 at 4-16 [Searle].
36 Reproduced in Searle, ibid. at 4-38.
37 Ibid. These agreements included the Environmental Agreement, impact and benefit
agreements and a socio-economic agreement with the Government of the Northwest
Territories. Each of these agreements went beyond the existing regulatory requirements
for the project.
38 Independent Review, supra note 27 at 16-17.
39 Supra note 28.
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the negotiations while the government negotiators took a seat at the back of the
room.40
The Minister’s statement had not specified the content of the agreement. One
item that moved far beyond the EA Panel Report was the creation of an indepen-
dent monitoring agency.41 The company, in its Environmental Impact Statement,
had advanced the idea of community involvement in monitoring, citing the exam-
ple of the 1972 agreement for the Island Copper mine on Vancouver Island. The
community around Ekati wanted something more “robust” and “with teeth.”42 The
Monitoring Agency created under the Environmental Agreement thus went beyond
both the company’s proposal and the recommendations of the EA Panel Report.
Why did this agreement happen at Ekati? Local Aboriginal groups were effec-
tive negotiators, with the legal and technical capacity to negotiate the agreements.
One company official described the Aboriginal negotiators involved as “the best
negotiators in the world” given their decades-long experience with land claims ne-
gotiations.43 A government minister also was willing to use his discretion and the
leverage afforded by an unsigned license to create pressure on the company to sign
the agreement. In addition, project economics were favourable. At Ekati, there was
timing pressure on BHPB to be the first company to mine the high-quality Cana-
dian diamonds.44 Further, BHPB had to work hard to keep its parent company’s
interest in the project through a long and expensive permitting phase. Agreements
with aboriginal groups and innovative mechanisms for environmental protection
were translated for the parent company as aspects of “sustainable development”: 
We had to keep it sexy and interesting for BHP [the parent company]. We
were in competition with the iron ore division for the company’s attention.
We used words like “sustainable development.” They liked that stuff.45
One negotiator likened the process of negotiating the Environmental Agree-
ment to “a butcher making hamburger.”46 Every obligation that did not have an-
other home was put in the Agreement. The Agreement attempts to fill gaps in the
regulatory regime, formalizing commitments made by BHPB during the EA pro-
cess that weren’t otherwise legalized. The Agreement also provides a basis for
monitoring that exceeds statutory requirements. It establishes comprehensive mech-
anisms for governing and reporting on environmental impacts. Finally, it provides
for the participation of Aboriginal groups.
40 Interview with subject B (16 July 2009).
41 William J. Couch, “Strategic Resolution of Policy, Environmental, and Socio-Eco-
nomic Impacts in Canadian Arctic Diamond Mining: BHP’s NWT Diamond Project”
(2002) 20(4) Impact Assessment and Project Appraisal 265 at 275.
42 Interview with subject E (22 July 2009).
43 Interview with subject A (20 May 2004).
44 Ekati diamonds in 2000 fetched an average carat price of US$168/carat while world-
wide production yielded an average price of US$60/carat. “Dia Met Minerals An-
nounces First Quarter Results From Ekati Diamond Mine, Net Earnings of $13.2 Mil-
lion or $0.43 per Share” Business Wire (26 June 2000).
45 Interview with subject A (20 May 2004).
46 Interview with subject B (16 July 2009).
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The major environmental concerns associated with the mine included its im-
pacts on wildlife (particularly the Bathurst caribou herd which is the largest herd in
Canada) and on aquatic ecosystems, the problems caused by mine waste, and the
cumulative impacts of the mine combined with other human impacts in the re-
gion.47 The Environmental Agreement addresses these concerns through:
• The Creation of the Monitoring Agency. The Agency provides expert
evaluation and monitoring of both company and government and ensures
the exchange of information between community members and the com-
pany, with particular attention to Aboriginal participation and over-
sight.48 The Monitoring Agency has a seven member Board of Directors,
four of whom are appointed directly by the Aboriginal organizations. The
remaining three directors are appointed jointly by the federal and territo-
rial governments and BHPB in consultation with the Aboriginal
organizations;49
• Environmental Management Plans.50 The content of the plans is to be
provided by BHPB and is not contained in the Agreement;
• Environmental Reporting. The Company must submit detailed annual re-
ports containing summaries of compliance and monitoring information
and a discussion of company responses to compliance problems. The par-
ties have an opportunity to comment on these reports.51 The federal and
territorial governments and BHPB are required to respond in writing to
any recommendations from the Monitoring Agency that they will not
implement;
• Environmental Monitoring Obligations for Air and Water Quality and
Wildlife.52 The monitoring programs are not set out in the Agreement but
are approved in conjunction with the Environmental Management Plans;
• A Security Deposit in the amount of $11.075 million for land impacts and
a guarantee of $20 million for potential water impacts are required.53
These funds may also be drawn upon if BHPB does not comply with
other requirements in the Agreement including non-compliance with re-
porting requirements or failure to rectify faulty management plans;
• A Closure and Reclamation Plan.54 Reclamation of the project is to be
undertaken progressively during the life of the project. Failure to restore
the project site will lead to use of the security deposit for this purpose;
47 William A. Ross, “The Independent Environmental Watchdog: A Canadian Experi-
ment in EIA Follow-up” in Angus Morrison-Saunders & Jos Arts, eds., Assessing Im-
pact: Handbook of EIA and SEA Follow-up (London: Earthscan, 2004) 178 at 185.
48 Ekati Environmental Agreement, supra note 5 at Article IV.
49 Ibid. at Article IV.
50 Ibid. at Article VI.
51 Ibid. at Article V.
52 Ibid. at Article VII.
53 Ibid. at Article XIII.
54 Ibid. at Article VIII.
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• Dispute Resolution Mechanisms include discussions, mediation, and
binding arbitration that shall be open to the public;55
• Traditional Knowledge is to be given “full consideration along with other
scientific knowledge” and incorporated into all environmental plans and
programs.56
The Agreement thus seeks to address the issues of greatest concern to the sur-
rounding communities. Absent the Environmental Agreement, there is no legisla-
tion providing for mine site-specific monitoring of migratory wildlife like the cari-
bou. There is also a desire to address monitoring at the ecosystem level, rather than
according to legal and jurisdictional divides that make little sense from an environ-
mental point of view. For example, jurisdiction over water issues is traditionally
divided between water licenses for water quality,57 and the Fisheries Act for fish
habitat protection.58 Having a monitoring agency willing to focus on what is hap-
pening to the environment as a whole is a departure from conventional monitoring
approaches.
(c) Defining Success and Failure
The Ekati Environmental Agreement is feted as a success story.59 But how do
we define its success or failure? One approach common to the study of environ-
mental agreements is to determine an agreement’s success by whether “it reaches
its own environmental targets.”60 Although this is a rather unambitious approach
and weak agreements may be defined as “successful” simply because they attempt
so little, it is one place to start.
The purposes of the Environmental Agreement are fivefold:
(a) to respect and protect land, water and wildlife and the land-based
economy, essential to the way of life and well-being of the Aboriginal
peoples;
(b) to facilitate the use of holistic and ecosystem-based approaches for
the monitoring, management and regulation of the Project;
(c) to provide advice to BHP to assist BHP in managing the Project con-
sistent with these purposes;
(d) to maximize the effectiveness and coordination of environmental
monitoring and regulation of the Project; and
(e) to facilitate effective participation of Aboriginal Peoples and the gen-
eral public in the achievement of the above purposes.61
55 Ibid. at Article XIV.
56 Ibid. at Article XI.
57 Northwest Territories Water Act, S.C. 1992, s. 14.
58 Fisheries Act, S.C. 1985, s. 5(f).
59 See supra note 41. For a positive assessment of the Monitoring Agency, in particular,
see Macleod Institute, Independent Environmental Monitoring Agency: Evaluation Re-
port (Calgary: Macleod Institute, 2000) [Macleod Institute].
60 Environmental Law Network International, supra note 3.
61 Ekati Environmental Agreement, supra note 5 at Article 2.1.
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If success in achieving these purposes is measured against a counterfactual
scenario in which there was no environmental agreement, the vast majority of those
interviewed suggest the Agreement is a success. The Monitoring Agency, in partic-
ular, is singled out as an example of the difference the Environmental Agreement
has made. The strengths and weaknesses of the Monitoring Agency have been as-
sessed in a number of articles and reports62 and graduate student theses.63 These
studies conclude that the Agency is widely perceived to be an effective mechanism
for technical review and management of environmental impacts at the mine.64
BHPB did not support the idea of creating (or having to fund) an independent
watchdog. The company suggests that the Monitoring Agency adds complexity and
confusion to the environmental management regime and allows government agen-
cies to avoid the responsibility they would normally bear under conventional regu-
latory regimes.65
Company complaints that the Monitoring Agency is at times “a pain in the
neck” are perhaps the best acknowledgement that the Agency is doing its job.66
Less effective is the integration of local knowledge by BHPB and by regulators into
environmental management and monitoring.67 The integration of traditional knowl-
edge is “simply not happening.”68 Aboriginal groups indicate a desire to be more
involved in monitoring, and to have youth trained to be monitors. They continue to
request and be denied separate capacity funding for this purpose.69 Aboriginal
groups were informed that they can use the funds they have obtained already from
the project (from impact and benefit agreement payments) for capacity building.70
Funding has also posed problems for the Monitoring Agency.71 Pursuant to
the dispute resolution clauses of the Agreement, two mediations have taken place
based on differences of opinion with respect to the Monitoring Agency’s indepen-
dence and budget work plan. These mediations highlight the problem of contractual
62 See supra note 47.
63 See supra note 31; Lindsay Galbraith, “Understanding the Need for SupraRegulatory
Agreements in Environmental Assessment: An Evaluation From the Northwest Territo-
ries, Canada” (M.A. Thesis, Simon Fraser University, 2005) [unpublished].
64 O’Faircheallaigh, supra note 12 at 16-17; Macleod Institute, supra note 59 at 9. Ac-
cording to interviews conducted as part of an Independent Review of the Ekati Mine
regulatory process, most participants in the process believe that it was effective in
achieving an acceptable end product. Independent Review, supra note 27 at 44.
65 O’Faircheallaigh, supra note 12 at 18.
66 Interview with subject B (16 July 2009).
67 Independent Environmental Monitoring Agency, Agency Annual Report 2002-2003
(Yellowknife: Independent Environmental Monitoring Agency, 2003) at 7.
68 Interview with subject C (22 July 2009).
69 Ibid.
70 Interview with subject C (22 July 2009).
71 The funding for the Monitoring Agency for the first two years was $450,000 each year
with BHPB contributing $350,000 and the remaining amount split between the federal
and territorial governments. Subsequent funding (approx. $500,000) is to be provided
directly by BHPB in consultation with the Monitoring Agency, based on work plans
and budgets. Ekati Environmental Agreement, supra note 5 at Article 5.6.
168   JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND PRACTICE [21 J.E.L.P.]
privity. Only the parties to the Agreement can invoke the dispute resolution provi-
sions. The Monitoring Agency is not a party. As parties to the agreement must
themselves fund any dispute resolution proceedings, it took a very long time to get
the government parties to call for mediation. This reveals an accountability deficit
in the Agreement as the agency tasked with monitoring the government and the
company is unable to invoke the dispute resolution clauses under the Agreement.
Tension around funding and a changing, more negative economic climate have
led to further fears that the company’s approach to the Agreement will become less
cooperative. In the words of one interviewee, the: 
Environmental agreement works well as long as everyone wants to cooper-
ate . . . Until the economic downturn, BHP and [the neighbouring mine]
Diavik were reasonable. They just paid the bills. When money got tighter,
things became more challenging. This is due to the companies’ perception
that they aren’t gaining much through the agencies they fund.72
BHPB’s cooperation is essential to the functioning of the Agreement. How-
ever, a major challenge in instilling a culture of cooperation between Aboriginal
groups, government officials, and BHPB arises from the huge and ongoing turnover
of personnel in the North. One interviewee was of the view that on both the com-
pany side and the government side, almost no one involved in negotiating the Envi-
ronmental Agreement was still around.73
In the event that BHPB fails to comply with the Agreement, a number of
mechanisms can be used to force compliance. One such mechanism is a Minister’s
Report which can be issued to compel the company to correct a deficiency or pro-
ceed to dispute resolution. Two Minister’s Reports have been issued so far at the
initiative of the GNWT. Both involved cases in which the GNWT expressed con-
cern that the BHPB’s reports were unsatisfactory due to unsubstantiated claims that
the effects of the project on air quality and wildlife monitoring were minor.74 De-
spite the fact that the company responded to the Minister’s Reports, one regulator
suggests that an environmental contract is not an effective tool for compelling a
company to do “something it doesn’t want to do.”75 Arguably, a government
agency such as the Land and Water Board would be much more effective in such
circumstances because it can stop work or withdraw licenses, and in so doing
quickly force companies to cooperate. This is the power of regulation.
(d) Beyond Ekati: the Diavik and Snap Lake Environmental
Agreements
The Ekati Environmental Agreement has led to innovations not only at the
Ekati mine but also for the major mining projects that followed in the Canadian
72 Interview with subject G (26 August 2009).
73 Interview with subject C (22 July 2009).
74 See Independent Environmental Monitoring Agency, 2006-07 Technical Annual Re-
port (Yellowknife: Independent Environmental Monitoring Agency, 2007) at 36.
75 Interview with subject G (22 August 2009).
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North.76 This agreement crystallized expectations about the degree of Aboriginal
participation in environmental agreements for major Canadian projects: opening up
the process of negotiating the Environmental Agreement to affected Aboriginal
communities meant it would be virtually impossible to return to a process of closed
negotiations between governments and project proponents in this region.
The Ekati Environmental Agreement provided a precedent and springboard for
the negotiation of environmental agreements for two other neighbouring diamond
mines, Diavik and Snap Lake. Unlike the case at Ekati, the affected Aboriginal
groups are parties to these two agreements.77 The environmental agreements con-
cluded for these two mines did not replicate the Ekati Monitoring Agency, but each
introduced a different form of monitoring agency. This change reflected the con-
cern that the Ekati model, while effective as a technical monitoring body, failed to
incorporate the local knowledge of Aboriginal groups and to act as a conduit for
communication between the company and the community.
In contrast with the Ekati model, the Diavik Environmental Monitoring Advi-
sory Board (EMAB) operates more as a community liaison group than as an inde-
pendent watchdog. Members of the Diavik EMAB sit as representatives of the par-
ties that appointed them. The company also has a place at the table.
The Snap Lake Agreement introduced a third variant on the theme of an inde-
pendent monitoring agency — reflecting a desire to forge some sort of middle
ground between the “expert evaluation” approach of the IEMA and the “commu-
nity oriented” focus of EMAB.78 The Snap Lake Environmental Monitoring
Agency (SLEMA) employs only Aboriginal group representatives.
The Snap Lake Agreement expressly contemplated the merging of the three
monitoring agencies.79 This was an acknowledgement of the cumulative impacts of
the three mines, and the possible cost and workload efficiencies that could be
achieved. The lack of interest from the three companies in a joint approach means
that a proposed agency appears unlikely to materialize. This has created problems
76 For example, the Voisey Bay Nickel Mine’s Environmental Management Agreement
was also at least partially based on the Ekati model. See Environmental Management
Agreement by and between the Government of Newfoundland and Labrador, the Gov-
ernment of Canada, Labrador Inuit Association, the Innu Nation (22 July 2002), on-
line: <http://www.nr.gov.nl.ca/voiseys/pdf/envmanagement.pdf>.
77 See Snap Lake Diamond Project Environmental Agreement by and between the Gov-
ernment of Canada, Government of Northwest Territories, De Beers Canada Mining
Inc. and the Dogrib Treaty 11 Council, Lutsel K’E Dene Band, Yellowknives Dene
First Nation and North Slave Me´tis Alliance (31 May 2004) [Snap Lake Environmental
Agreement], online:
<http://www.slema.ca/documents_.php?page=SLEMA/Misc%20Documents/2004>;
Diavik Environmental Agreement by and between the Government of Canada, Govern-
ment of Northwest Territories, Diavik Diamond Mines Inc, Dogrib Treaty 11 Council,
Lutsel K’E Dene Band, Yellowknives Dene First Nation and North Slave Me´tis Alli-
ance, and Kitikmeot Inuit Association (8 March 2000), [Diavik Environmental Agree-
ment], online:
<http://www.diavik.ca/documents/Diavik_Environmental_Agreement.pdf>.
78 Interview with subject D (22 July 2009).
79 Snap Lake Environmental Agreement, supra note 77 at Article 8.1.
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for SLEMA which was only contemplated by the Snap Lake Agreement to be an
interim solution, leaving a budget shortfall that no one is willing to fill.
Canadian non-profit groups have also worked to disseminate the experience of
the Ekati mine internationally. The Canadian Environmental Law Association held
a workshop in Lima, Peru reviewing agreements between mining companies and
Aboriginal communities in Canada. This workshop included a discussion of envi-
ronmental agreements, and, in particular, the Monitoring Agency.80 The North-
South Institute in Canada has published a case study documenting the experiences
of one First Nation, the Lutsel K’e Dene, in negotiating with mining companies,
including their experience with the Ekati Mine.81 The Lutsel K’e Dene have shared
their experiences at Ekati with other communities facing the prospect of negotia-
tions with BHPB and other global mining companies over mines in their communi-
ties.82 BHPB has also used the Ekati model as evidence that it successfully incor-
porates indigenous peoples in its mining operations. Thus, in a conflict in Botswana
over claims of the displacement of Kalahari Bushmen, BHPB cited the Ekati exam-
ple as a model of their successful relationship with indigenous peoples and their
desire to negotiate with the Bushmen.83
4. RE-THINKING ENVIRONMENTAL CONTRACTING
In this section, I use the experience of the Ekati Agreement just discussed to
shed some empirical light on a number of assumptions that currently shape the
literature on environmental contracting. A dominant theme that pervades the envi-
ronmental contracting literature (as well as the wider literature on “new govern-
ance” approaches to environmental law) is that contracting belongs to that sphere
of governance that is innovative, cooperative, negotiated, creative, customized and
new.84 Regulation then becomes cast as traditional, confrontational, imposed, “bus-
iness as usual,” and a “one-size-fits-all” model.85 The tendency to frame con-
tracting in this binary way (contractual vs. regulatory, private law vs. public law,
interventionist vs. deregulatory) imports an unnecessarily narrow vision of both
contracting and regulating, which this article seeks to correct. As the Ekati experi-
80 Sosa & Keenan, supra note 27.
81 Viviane Weitzner, Dealing Full Force: Lutsel K’e Dene First Nation’s Experience Ne-
gotiating with Mining Companies (2006), online: <http://www.nsi-
ins.ca/english/pdf/Full_Force_Eng.pdf>.
82 See the Panel Presentation on Suriname and the Lutsel K’e Dene First Nation in “Min-
ing in or Near Ancestral Lands in the Americas: Summary Report” (Ottawa: The
North-South Institute & The Assembly of First Nations, 2005), online:
<http://www.nsi-ins.ca/english/pdf/Summary_Report_Oct5_Eng.pdf>.
83 Tom Price, “Kalahari Bushmen Take on Mining Titan Over Right to Land” Business
Day (8 October 2004).
84 See Bradley C. Karkkainen, “Information-Forcing Environmental Regulation” (2005-
2006) 33 Fla. St. U.L. Rev. 861; Jody Freeman & Daniel A. Farber, “Modular Environ-
mental Regulation” (2005) 54 Duke L.J. 795.
85 For a thoughtful discussion of the social construction of regulation, see Timothy F.
Malloy, “The Social Construction of Regulation: Lessons from the War Against Com-
mand and Control” (2010) 58 Buffalo L. Rev. 267.
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ence reveals, the line between “regulating” and “contracting” becomes blurred as
contracting occurs against a backdrop of the regulatory state, and as regulators
enter into contracts. As Geoffrey Hazard and Eric Orts suggest, the differences be-
tween contract and regulation are real and important, but they are largely differ-
ences of degree rather than kind.86
While the Ekati Agreement introduced institutional novelties by way of con-
tract, the contractual form is not necessary to achieve much of what this Agreement
delivered. Indeed, contracts and regulation are not bound in some zero sum rela-
tionship. Contracts may be used to fill regulatory gaps. But the promise of environ-
mental contracting is not purely about the pitfalls of regulating. Moreover, the con-
tractual form is not a neutral governance choice. This form of governance may
signal wider cultural and discursive transformations at work, and a shift in gov-
erning practices.
I am attentive in this section to the dangers of lumping together a range of
contracts, and literatures, that differ significantly. Project-specific “microcon-
tracts”, industry-wide “macrocontracts,” contracts which do or do not involve gov-
ernment regulators, all exhibit important distinctions.87 Yet, there is utility in ex-
amining these agreements, and this emerging body of literature, together to
understand the claims that are being made about the contractual form and its prom-
ise. A collective approach to this scholarship also sheds light on the assumptions
that underlie claims about both regulation and contracting. The exercise of identify-
ing eight assumptions that shape the literature on environmental contracting reveals
the need to move away from preconceived and knee-jerk notions of what contracts
can and cannot do towards a more critical and grounded reflection of the promise,
and pitfalls, of environmental contracts.
(a) Eight Assumptions of the Environmental Contracting Literature
(i) The Assumption of Voluntarism
One assumption that pervades the literature is that companies choose to enter
into environmental agreements with regulators. As rational actors, companies
weigh the costs and benefits of contracting against the “default rules” of regulation
and make an informed choice whether to contract or not. Indeed, the law and eco-
nomics literature on environmental contracting relies heavily on the default rule
paradigm to explain where contracting will be an optimal approach.88 Underlying
such an approach is an assumption that contracts are voluntary, and that companies
are at liberty to choose whether to contract, or not. This is the myth of choice.
86 Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. & Eric W. Orts, “Environmental Contracts in the United
States” in Eric W. Orts & Kurt Deketelaere, eds., Environmental Contracts: Compara-
tive Approaches to Regulatory Innovation in the United States and Europe (London:
Kluwer Law International, 2001) 71 at 77.
87 The terms “microcontracts” and “macrocontracts” belong to Richard Stewart. See
Stewart, supra note 4 at 60.
88 See e.g. Jason Scott Johnston, “The Law and Economics of Environmental Contracts”
in Eric W. Orts & Kurt Deketelaere, eds., Environmental Contracts: Comparative Ap-
proaches to Regulatory Innovation in the United States and Europe (London: Kluwer
Law International, 2001) 271.
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The negotiating history of the Ekati Agreement reveals how such an assump-
tion may be misplaced. The company negotiators felt they had little choice but to
enter into the Agreement, as contracting was imposed as a prerequisite for getting
an essential permit, the water license. Given the lack of legal basis for this contract,
the company’s lawyers contemplated challenging the agreement requirement
through judicial review proceedings but they ultimately chose to enter into negotia-
tions instead. It is hardly appropriate to categorize this as a “voluntary” decision.
While the Ekati example may be an extreme example in terms of lack of choice,89
it allows us to query the illusory nature of voluntarism, particularly when one party
to an agreement is the government.
The second way in which contracts have been framed as voluntary in both the
scholarly and popular literature is through the equally misleading packaging of
these agreements as corporate initiatives, corporate self-regulation, and corporate
social responsibility.90 Environmental agreements are increasingly colonized by the
energetic corporate social responsibility movement and are framed as corporate ini-
tiatives in academic treatises,91 corporate public relations materials,92 and as an
aspect of investor relations and marketing by mining companies. While the lan-
guage differs, the underlying message is the same: these agreements are evidence
of corporate goodwill, rather than binding law. Such packaging serves to under-
mine the essential legal nature of the contract. Framing environmental agreements
as corporate social responsibility93 or as corporate initiatives94 also allows mining
companies to claim responsibility for these agreements. It obscures the community
groups, Aboriginal peoples, and government agencies responsible for this form of
regulation, and misleadingly repackages binding contracts as voluntary initiatives.
(ii) The Assumption of “Softness”
Closely intertwined with the assumption of voluntarism is the categorization
of environmental contracting as exhibiting “softness.” Softness alternatively refers
to many things: “flexibility, non-coerciveness, informalism, less rigid procedural
requirements, and nonenforcement or nonenforceability.”95 The designation or di-
89 The claim of voluntarism, in contrast, is often made with respect to a negotiated agree-
ment that explicitly modifies or replaces the regulatory requirements that would apply
in the absence of such an agreement. For examples, see Stewart, supra note 4 at 60–94.
90 See Peter D. Cameron & Ernesto Correa, “Towards the Contractual Management of
Public-Participation Issues: A Review of Corporate Initiatives” in Donald Zillman,
Alastair Lucas & George (Rock) Pring, eds., Human Rights in Natural Resource Devel-
opment (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002) 215 [Cameron & Correa].
91 See e.g. Natalia Yakovleva, Corporate Social Responsibility in the Mining Industries
(London: Ashgate, 2005) at 90-91.
92 See Jim Excell (President and CEO, Ekati Diamond Mine), “The Ekati Diamond Mine:
Success in Canada’s North,” Speech to the Empire Club, in Edward P. Badovinac, ed.,
The Empire Club of Canada Speeches 2002-2003 (2004) 351–371.
93 See e.g. supra note 91.
94 Cameron & Correa, supra note 90 at 11.
95 Karkkainen, supra note 7 at 485.
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agnosis of “softness” in the literature is particularly directed to issues of contractual
enforcement absent the penalty-driven back-up of command regulation.
There is little evidence that parties to environmental contracts use the courts to
enforce these agreements.96 In the Ekati case study, however, it is difficult to con-
clude that enforcement challenges derive from any “softness” of the Agreement. To
the contrary, the highly formalized nature of the Ekati Agreement has posed
problems for the Monitoring Agency in seeking to enforce the terms of its mandate.
As a non-party, the Monitoring Agency is unable to access the dispute resolution
provisions under the Agreement, or to sue for breach of contract. Indeed, the expe-
rience of the Agreement has been that due to its formal contractual nature and the
legalized nature of dispute resolution under the Agreement, only issues that are
“really big deals” are brought forward for dispute resolution.97
In terms of day to day issues of non-compliance with the Agreement, a num-
ber of those interviewed expressed the view that a statutory body, such as the Land
and Water Board, with the power to revoke licenses and issue stop-work orders,
was a more effective tool to force a company to do something they didn’t want to
do than the Ekati Environmental Agreement, which was lacking in both specificity,
and penalties for issues of minor non-compliance.98 While the Agreement offered
“big sticks” in terms of Ministerial Reports for significant inadequacies, these rem-
edies were neither routinely used nor designed for routine use.
(iii) The Assumption of Collaboration
The ideal of an environmental contract is one where bargaining approaches
“can lead to more sensible, less burdensome, and perhaps even environmentally
more beneficial results, while dispelling the curse of adversarialism that hangs
over the regulatory order.”99 Contracts offer “a more consensual approach to deal-
ing with the high levels of uncertainty that are characteristic of environmental is-
sues.”100 But, contracting may not erase or even alleviate adversarial relationships.
Some sceptics interviewed in the course of this research suggest that contracts are
not about collaborative problem solving, rather, for companies, contracting is a
96 Rene´ Seerden, “Legal Aspects of Environmental Agreements in the Netherlands, in
Particular the Agreement on Packaging and Packaging Waste” in Eric W. Orts & Kurt
Deketelaere, Environmental Contracts: Comparative Approaches to Regulatory Inno-
vation in the United States and Europe (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2001)
179 at 193 (“to my knowledge there have been so far no court actions concerning the
implementation of environmental agreements. The paucity of litigation may owe in part
to the fact that many agreements, though formally written as private law contracts,
function also as an expression of internalized behavior.”).
97 Interview with subject C (22 July 2009).
98 Ibid.
99 Jon Cannon, “Bargaining, Politics, and Law in Environmental Regulation” in Eric W.
Orts & Kurt Deketelaere, Environmental Contracts: Comparative Approaches to Regu-
latory Innovation in the United States and Europe (The Hague: Kluwer Law Interna-
tional, 2001) 39 at 39 (emphasis mine).
100 Thompson Report, supra note 19 at 16 (emphasis mine).
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form of “buying off resistance.”101 For aboriginal groups, contractual negotiations
may be one of the few opportunities available for agenda-setting and exercising
leverage in project-specific negotiations. Contracts may deliver a transformation of
traditionally antagonistic relationships between citizens and experts into “partner-
ships for environmental protection.”102 But, this is not necessarily the case.
So while the literature cites one advantage of the “contracts model of regula-
tion” as being the opportunity it affords the parties to build relationships,103 this
relationship-building will not always happen. In the Ekati experience, the high turn-
over of personnel in a remote mining centre works against the establishment of
cooperative working relationships. Moreover, mining projects tend to be sur-
rounded by mistrust and adversarial relationships that are not easily erased through
negotiations.104
(iv) The Assumption of “Regulatory Design”
The contracting literature frames contracting as an intentional and predeter-
mined aspect of regulatory strategy. In other words, contracts are well-considered
pieces of a larger, carefully designed framework of environmental governance.
Such a picture of intentional regulatory design differs sharply from the Ekati expe-
rience. At Ekati, the Environmental Agreement evolved in an experimental, hap-
hazard, and totally unplanned way. There was no advance planning as to the appro-
priateness of an environmental agreement as the most suitable regulatory tool, nor
was the content of such an agreement even prescribed for the parties whose task
was to make “substantial progress” in negotiating such an agreement in 60 days.
The lack of a legislative base for this agreement further debunks the myth of regu-
latory design.
Closely intertwined with the idea of “regulatory design” is a related assump-
tion of creativity. The “underlying premise” of the Thompson Report is that “con-
tracts offer greater opportunity for creative solutions to environmental and social
problems than does conventional government regulation backed by criminal
law.”105 Creative is a term with multiple meanings. In the contracting literature, it
typically denotes an imaginative or innovative development. So defined, there is
nothing necessarily creative about the contractual form. While contracts are often
project-specific and can thus be tailored to individual projects, they can also rely
heavily on earlier precedents rather than introducing new context-based innova-
tions. There is equally little reason why regulation cannot provide for creative envi-
ronmental governance.
101 Interview with subject B (16 July 2009).
102 Charles Sabel, Archon Fung & Bradley Karkkainen, Beyond Backyard Environmental-
ism (Boston: Beacon Press, 2000) 6.
103 See Doelle, supra note 12 at 210.
104 Interview subjects noted that the lack of trust marked not only relationships between
aboriginal groups and the government and company, but that lack of trust also charac-
terized the relationship between departments of the federal and territorial governments.
See, for example, interview with subject G (26 August 2009).
105 Thompson Report, supra note 19 at 2 (emphasis mine).
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(v) The Assumption of Deregulation
Is contracting a form of government contracting out? The literature that posits
contracts and regulation as fixed in a binary either/or relationship suggests that the
advance of contracts will mean the retreat of the state. In Canada, concerns have
been expressed that the federal and provincial governments are withdrawing from
the tasks of environmental monitoring and enforcement in favour of self-regulation
by mining companies.106 In the wider literature, a move towards consensus-based
decision-making raises concerns about the decentring of the state and the shift to
promote private interests.107
The Ekati Environmental Agreement, and the Monitoring Agency which it
creates, marks a shift in the role of governments in mine regulation and monitoring.
With the creation of the Monitoring Agency, governments are no longer solely re-
sponsible for ensuring effective monitoring during the life of the mine. As the au-
thors of a report on the approval process acknowledge: “one is tempted to refer to
what occurred as a ‘privatization’ of certain government functions, although this
term is not entirely accurate to the extent that Aboriginal groups’ involvement in
the BHP process reflects a quasi-governmental status.”108 But, contracts do not
necessarily push in the direction of corporate self-regulation, or of less government.
They are not necessarily deregulatory.109 Contracts can provide for an increased
role of the state in environmental management, if the political will is there.110
(vi) The Assumption of Certainty
An often-cited rationale for contracts is that they can replace vague under-
standings and arbitrary actions with “certainty.”111 Contracts, of course, differ in
respect of their specificity. The Ekati Agreement, for example, provides little detail
of the substantive environmental regime that will govern mine operations. Instead,
much of the substance of waste management, water management, and monitoring
regimes, for example, is left to be described in environmental management plans to
be produced by the company.112 Aside from the creation of the Monitoring
106 Joseph F. Castrilli, “Environmental Regulation of the Mining Industry in Canada: An
Update of Legal and Regulatory Requirements” (2000) 34 U.B.C. L. Rev. 91 at para.
118 (noting that “in conjunction with deregulation and downloading efforts by govern-
ment, there has been a corresponding rise in voluntary initiatives by industry, including
the mining industry”).
107 See e.g. Cary Coglianese, “Is Consensus an Appropriate Basis for Regulatory Policy”
in Orts & Dekeletaere, supra note 12 at 93.
108 Independent Review, supra note 27 at 39.
109 Braithwaite and Ayres acknowledge that in western democracies we are in a period not
simply of “deregulation” but also of re-regulation and regulatory shifts. Ian Ayres &
John Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation: Transcending the Deregulation Debate (Ox-
ford: Oxford University Press, 1992) at 7.
110 The requirement of additional security deposits mandated by the Ekati Environmental
Agreement is one example of a greater state presence imposed on the company by this
Agreement.
111 Thompson Report, supra note 19 at 7.
112 Ekati Environmental Agreement, supra note 5 at Article 7.1.
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Agency, and the provisions on Aboriginal involvement, it would be difficult to say
from a textual analysis of the Agreement that environmental management standards
would differ from levels otherwise applicable under existing regulation. The sub-
stantive elements of management and monitoring regimes are left to be worked out
outside the Agreement text. Further, the “untested” nature of the contractual regime
created considerable uncertainty for the parties. One could argue that the use of
environmental contracts in the Canadian North has created a situation of significant
uncertainty as it is unclear whether or not such agreements will be required for
future large projects.
(vii) The Assumption that Contract Law is Apolitical
While the public/private divide has so effectively been dismantled in other
areas, this distinction emerges in the contracting sphere where contract law is char-
acterized as belonging to the private law family, while regulation is situated in the
public law fields of public or administrative law. This distinction serves to de-em-
phasize the political nature of contract law.113
The description in this article of the negotiating process leading up to the Ekati
Agreement effectively debunks the myth of contract as apolitical. Political reasons
provide the context for understanding the existing gaps in legislation, and, specifi-
cally, why wildlife and air quality monitoring regimes were not already in place. In
the case of air regulation, the problem was one of “getting the attention of Environ-
mental Canada in Ottawa.”114 Federal legislation was cited as extremely unlikely to
emerge because this was a “local issue” and “the Northwest Territories only has
two seats in the House of Commons.”115
Legislation addressing wildlife monitoring was suggested to be equally un-
likely due to the jurisdictional infighting between the federal government, territorial
government, and aboriginal groups with unsettled land claims. The likelihood of
the federal government handing authority to the territorial government to do more
than “manage game” was thought to be improbable given that handing over author-
ity would involve handing over funds. Equally doubtful was the prospect of aborig-
inal groups agreeing to the territorial government taking on greater jurisdiction in
this area given that wildlife was a key issue in land claims negotiations.116
Indeed, one regulator expressed the view that environmental agreements are
not a good means of ensuring appropriate wildlife management because “they are
not designed on the basis of what needs to be done and have substantial political
baggage.”117 Negotiated processes are highly subject to political forces. In the case
of the Snap Lake Environmental Agreement negotiations, one participant recounted
that the federal government had given clear marching orders to get the project
113 See Stepan Wood’s thoughtful challenge to the tendency to depoliticize environmental
management. Stepan Wood, “Environmental Management Systems and Public Author-
ity in Canada: Rethinking Environmental Governance” (2002) 10 Buff. Envtl. L. J.
129.
114 Interview with subject E (22 July 2009).
115 Ibid.
116 Interview with subject G (26 August 2009).
117 Ibid.
RETHINKING ENVIRONMENTAL CONTRACTING   177
open.118 As a result, they were instructed to choose between getting detailed pro-
tection of wildlife or air into the Agreement. Contractual negotiations, like regula-
tory approaches, are the products of political compromise.
(viii) The Assumption of the Discrete Agreement
Environmental contracts are often analyzed as though they exist in an airtight
bubble. The advantages and disadvantages of the agreement text are discussed in a
way that obscures the complexities of the wider world from intruding on the analy-
sis. Contractual regimes, however, are deeply embedded in regulatory frameworks.
They are rarely complete, contained, or isolated. This is quickly evident from the
interaction between the environmental assessment (EA) regime and the Environ-
mental Agreement at Ekati. A simple analysis of this relationship is that the EA
process was perceived to be inadequate, thus necessitating the creation of the
Agreement. But the relationship between the Agreement and the EA is more
nuanced. Rather than operating competitively, these two regimes are interdepen-
dent. The Environmental Agreement sought to ensure that the 29 issues identified
in the course of the EA were addressed. A vigorous EA process was thus a prereq-
uisite to the creation of a robust environmental agreement. The EA provides the
essential information on which such an agreement will be based. Moreover, in the
case of the Diavik mine, the Environmental Agreement emerged out of the EA
process, as a recommendation of the Diavik Comprehensive Study and was re-
quired to ensure implementation of mitigation measures under the Canadian Envi-
ronmental Assessment Act.119
The wider regulatory backdrop to the Ekati Agreement was also critical as the
Minister’s discretion over the signing of the water license provided the necessary
leverage to get the company to negotiate an agreement in the first place. The con-
clusion that emerges here, that contracts and regulation can work well in tandem, is
consistent with the emerging literature on “responsive regulation” or “smart regula-
tion.”120 The best way to complement or facilitate negotiated agreements through
regulation is an issue of ongoing research.121
The literature on contracts tends to explore each contract in isolation as a static
and fixed instrument rather than mapping out webs of interrelated contracts, and
contemplating contractual renegotiation. This leads to an impoverished vision of
the environmental regulatory landscape. For the Ekati mine, the emergence of two
subsequent environmental agreements to govern neighbouring mines has high-
lighted the reality that change is part of contractual relationships. The Snap Lake
Environmental Agreement thus proposed a common monitoring agency for the
three mines, a condition that would significantly alter the monitoring regime under
118 Ibid.
119 See Diavik Environmental Agreement, supra note 77 at Recital D.
120 Neil Gunningham & Peter Grabosky, Smart Regulation: Designing Environmental Pol-
icy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998) at 15.
121 See John Moffet, Bryan David & Burkhard Mausberg, “Supporting Negotiated Envi-
ronmental Agreements with Statutory and Regulatory Provisions: an Overview for On-
tario” (Environmental Defence Canada, 17 October 2002).
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the Ekati Agreement.122 The three companies would not renegotiate their original
agreements to provide for a new collective deal on monitoring. The failure to con-
clude a renegotiated agreement on a collective monitoring regime points to a real
limitation of individual contracts as a mechanism for addressing multi-party issues
and the cumulative impacts of multiple projects.
(b) Environmental Contracts: of Form and Substance
It is admittedly difficult to determine if environmental contracting can produce
results that regulation cannot, based on a single case study. But, the Ekati experi-
ence is informative. This case study reminds us that differences in legal form are
real and significant, but not as entrenched as the literature often assumes. What the
Agreement managed to achieve (an independent environmental monitoring body
with a track record of diligence in monitoring) and what the Agreement failed to
achieve (transformational levels of aboriginal participation in environmental man-
agement and monitoring and substantive attention to cumulative effects) may not
be tied to the form of the agreement (a contract). But, form is not irrelevant to
substance.
The substantive innovations introduced in this agreement (marking real depar-
tures from the status quo ante) may have been possible in part due to the one-off,
project-specific, and experimental form of the contract. But, the success of con-
tracts in introducing more robust elements of environmental management and mon-
itoring does not mean that these improvements would not also be possible through
regulatory change. In other words, the success of contracts does not undermine the
utility of regulation. While the contracting literature presents contracts as a unique
and attractive model, the Ekati experience confirms that contracting on the ground
is far more complex than any model acknowledges, and that contracting and regu-
lating are often intertwined.
Indeed, several ironies are evident in the Ekati experience with environmental
contracting. The first is that the contract was only possible because of the threat of
regulatory power. The Minister’s leverage used to secure the contract was the un-
signed water license. The second irony is that to be effective, environmental agree-
ments require cooperative and open-minded companies. Yet, as one regulator
noted, “if the company you are working with is integrating ISO 14001 and being an
environmental leader, you probably don’t need an environmental agreement as
much.”123
Those observations aside, the contractual form still carries with it certain polit-
ical baggage. When the process of contracting is understood within the wider con-
text of neoliberalism and a retreating state, environmental contracting may signal a
paradigm shift in governing practices and ideologies.
122 See Snap Lake Environmental Agreement, supra note 77 at s. 8.1(c) (requiring the
proponent, De Beers, to “use its best efforts to collaborate with Diavik Diamond Mines
[and] BHP Diamonds”).
123 Interview with subject G (22 August 2009).
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5. CONCLUSION
The Ekati Environmental Agreement experience merits exploration for at least
two reasons. First, it highlights the importance of project-specific governance, an
often-neglected element of Canadian environmental law. Second, it allows us to
unpack and indeed challenge many key assumptions in the environmental con-
tracting literature. The Ekati case study reveals that contracts hold promise as a
mechanism of project-specific governance that responds to the unique demands of
local communities and Aboriginal groups. But, the development of environmental
contracts does not excuse or justify government inaction and inadequate legislation.
A closely focussed examination of the Ekati Environmental Agreement brings
to light a number of assumptions that currently shape the literature on contracting,
and, more widely, on new governance. The enthusiastic embrace of environmental
contracts by legal scholars reveals an understandable enthusiasm for alternative
modes of environmental governance capable of precisely targeting the inadequacies
of environmental regulatory regimes. A close look at this scholarship reveals that
some of the assumed benefits and limitations of contracting may not stand up to
closer scrutiny. For example, the much-touted flexible nature of environmental
contracts may, in practice, be limited by the fact that precedents are heavily relied
upon; the “voluntary” nature of agreements entered into with regulators can be que-
ried; the collaborative nature of these agreements may prove illusory; and environ-
mental agreements may exacerbate, rather than reduce, uncertainty.
A concern around contracting that is not well highlighted by the Ekati experi-
ence is the challenge of the exclusion of the larger public from the “behind closed
doors” negotiations that characterize contractual deals. An environmental agree-
ment was particularly suited to the Ekati Mine setting as the affected community
was small, consisting of defined Aboriginal groups. In other situations, defining the
parties to the negotiation, and the parties to the agreement may be a more difficult
task. Who the parties are is of huge significance given the issue of contractual priv-
ity, but narrowing the interests represented at the bargaining table can exclude im-
portant voices. As environmental agreements are negotiated, they may aggravate
the existing marginalization of certain voices within communities, or even within
negotiating groups. For example, women have only been marginally involved in at
least the formal aspects of the negotiation of impact and benefit agreements be-
tween mining companies and First Nations.124 A further risk lies in the parties
privileging short-term, local gains over wider, long-term benefits.
Ultimately, reciting strengths and weaknesses of environmental agreements
fails to answer the fundamental question as to whether private environmental con-
tracting can produce certain results that government regulation cannot. A definitive
answer to this question will only emerge from more extensive, comparative re-
search. The Ekati experience may suggest that contracts can achieve results that
regulation will not. But, the power and possibilities of contracts appears to be more
about political realities, and less about legal ones.
124 See Linda Archibald & Mary Crnkovich, If Gender Mattered: A Case Study of Inuit
Women, Land Claims and the Voisey’s Bay Nickel Project (Ottawa: Status of Women
Canada, 1999) at 2.
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It is difficult to assert that there is an innate legal reason why a contract may
provide a better environmental outcome for a project than a regulatory approach.
However, there are political reasons why certain legislated solutions are unlikely to
happen and why gaps in the regulations are likely to endure, rather than be “fixed.”
Part of the attraction of a contract is to initiate a “fix” in small, bite-sized chunks.
The pragmatic use of contracts reflects the gap between what is possible through
regulation, and what is likely. 
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